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198 
The Empirical Turn in International 
Economic Law 
Beth A. Simmons** and Andrew B. Breidenbach*** 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2010, the American Society of International 
Law’s International Economic Law Interest Group (ASIL 
IELIG) convened a broad cross-section of scholars, 
practitioners, and students of international economic law. The 
focus of this conference was International Economic Law in a 
Time of Change: Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, 
Methodology and Policy Prescriptions. Surveying the field, we 
became aware of certain swings in attitudes—from skepticism 
to euphoria and back to skepticism again—toward the 
empirical work that, of late, has been seeping into the 
curriculum and research of legal academies. If we want to know 
how the world is changing—and how our legal rules shape and 
should respond to that change—empirical studies are simply 
unavoidable. At the same time, the real benefit of empirical 
studies is always a function of how intelligently such studies 
are conceived and executed. The empirical turn in international 
economic law is inevitable, but the meaning of that turn is not. 
Thus, as this paper will discuss, to ensure that legal scholars 
and empirical researchers are maximizing their ability to 
understand and influence this time of change in international 
economic law, collaboration—not distrust—between these 
 
 This paper is adapted from the Keynote Address given by Professor Simmons 
on November 18, 2010 at the American Society of International Law 
International Economic Law Interest Group conference held at the University 
of Minnesota Law School, “International Economic Law in a Time of Change: 
Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions.” In 
this paper, the authors have deliberately adopted a tone that lies somewhere 
between the strained formality of a law review article and the feigned 
nonchalance of an academic address.  
** Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs; Director, Weatherhead 
Center for International Affairs, Government Department, Harvard 
University. 
*** J.D. candidate, May 2011, Harvard Law School; M.Sc. International 
Political Economy, London School of Economics & Political Science, 2007.  
SIMMONS - Final Version 4/22/2011 4:04 PM 
2011] THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN INT’L ECONOMIC LAW 199 
 
groups will be essential.  
The relationship between empirical social scientists, 
lawyers, and legal researchers often recalls that of Sherlock 
Holmes (the “sage”) and Dr. Watson (the “know-it-all 
scientist”). Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson were lovers of the 
outdoors, so come spring one year, it was hardly surprising that 
they decided to spend a weekend camping on the Sussex downs. 
As night fell, they pitched their tent, put on nightshirts, 
nightcaps and bed socks; and after a soothing cup of cocoa, said 
a cordial goodnight and went to sleep. A few hours later, the 
following conversation ensued: 
Holmes nudged Watson, and said: “Watson, Watson, look at the 
stars!” 
“What, what?” said Watson, roused from a deep slumber. “Ah yes, 
Holmes, the stars.”  
“Well,” said Holmes, “what do you make of them?” 
Watson, by then awake, summoned his academic training in the 
scientific method and said: “Well, Holmes, judging by the position of 
the stars and the moon, I deduce chronologically, that it is some three 
hours since we fell asleep; geographically, that the earth has rotated 
forty-five degrees during that time; astronomically, that the handle of 
the big dipper is still pointing to the north star; and finally, 
meteorologically, that we can expect a fine day tomorrow. Will that 
do?” 
“You idiot,” said Holmes. “I meant that someone has stolen our tent!” 
As Holmes points out, it is sometimes necessary to look at 
a situation from a broader perspective to see what is 
transpiring and not just focus on the details. Like Holmes, we 
will focus our attentions on the big picture: Where is the “tent”? 
What is the role of international economic law in a changing 
world, and how can the work of empirical social scientists 
complement that of legal scholars in thinking about and 
responding to that change? 
I. THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 
We begin by defining what we mean by “empirical” 
research. At the most general level, empirical research is 
anything that is not purely theoretical or purely doctrinal.1 
Selected anecdotes and isolated historical episodes are, in this 
sense, empirical. But what we intend to focus on in this paper 
is something more systematic: by “empirical” we mean a 
 
 1. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 
2003). 
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systematic examination of observable phenomena from which 
the researcher explicitly seeks to draw broader conclusions 
about the way the world—or some part of it—works. As we 
envision it here, empirical research is about trying to draw 
conclusions that, to some degree, are generalizable; that is, 
conclusions that apply to more than one specific historical case. 
This is the kind of empiricism lawyers should care about 
because, as scholars and practitioners, their professional raison 
d’etre is to develop rules with broad applicability. 
The empirical turn in legal scholarship generally has been 
pretty well-documented.2 Indeed, there is even a law school 
ranking based on institutional strength in empirical legal 
studies.3 In the specific area of international economic law, the 
trend is less noted, but is on the rise. A Westlaw search of the 
“journals and law reviews” database shows that the number of 
articles containing the term “international economic law” and 
some variant of “empirical” or “statistical significance” has 
increased almost six-fold since 1998.4 Almost a third of that 
increase has been published in the past four years alone.5 
Moreover, one of the leading international economic law 
journals—the Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL), 
which first went to press in 1998—is peer-reviewed,6 something 
considered “quirky” in the field of law.7 Its emphasis is on 
 
 2. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss, When do Facts Persuade? Some 
Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 17 (2008); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Why do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741 
(2004); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and 
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984).  
 3. See George, supra note 2.  
 4. Using Westlaw’s Journals and Law Reviews (JLR) Database, the 
authors conducted the following searches and obtained the following results on 
January 27, 2011: (1) date(bef 1998) & “international economic law” & 
“statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 149 results; (2) date(1998) & “international 
economic law” & “statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 48 results; (3) date(aft 
1998) & “international economic law” & “statistic! signific!” or “empiric!” – 830 
results. (830 + 48) / 149 = 5.892. 
 5. A search of (date(aft 2005) & “international economic law” & “statistic! 
signific!” or “empiric!”) returned 406 results. 1027 (the total number of results 
over all years) / 406 = 2.529. 
 6. Information for Authors, J. INT’L ECON. L., 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/for_authors/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2011).  
 7. Michael J. Madison, The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige 
and Open Access, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 901, 909 (2006) (“([A]side from a 
few quirky journals) there is no peer review [of legal scholarship].”).  
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studying “fundamental, long-term, systemic problems and 
[offering] possible solutions, in the light of empirical 
observations and experience[,]”8 and it appears well able to do 
so: of the 56 members9 of the editorial board of the JIEL (which 
reads like a Who’s Who of IEL scholars, many of whom were at 
the conference), 30 have PhDs or SJDs, and thus are likely to 
have some training in quantitative methods.10 And of the 82 or 
so speakers and moderators at the conference, 32 (or 39%) have 
PhDs or SJDs.11  
It would be easy, of course, to overstate the significance of 
these figures. For example, at the ASIL IELG Conference at 
Bretton Woods in November 2006 on the state and future of the 
international economic law discipline, 43% (17 of 39) of the 
speakers and moderators had PhDs or SJDs—more, 
percentage-wise, than at the recent conference.12 Moreover, 
there is a striking contrast between the composition of the 
JIEL Editorial Board and this conference—whereas there are a 
good number of Economics PhDs. on the former, there were few 
at the recent conference. But it is no stretch to conclude that on 
top of the wealth of legal knowledge in our field, we also have a 
good amount of empirical expertise. Indeed, substantial 
empirical research is taking place in all types of international 
economic law. International trade law continues to be the main 
locus of empirical work,13 but great strides continue to be made 
 
 8. About the Journal, J. INT’L ECON. L., 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jielaw/about.html (last visited Jan. 
28, 2011). 
 9. This figure does not include the editorial advisory board members. See 
Editorial Board, J. INT’L ECON. L., http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals
/jielaw/editorial_board.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).  
 10. This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the editorial 
board members. Id. See also, http://www.ijiel.com/boed.htmlhttp://www.ijiel.co
m/boed.html 
 11. This number was arrived at by canvassing the resumes of the 
conference participants, including panel members and other speakers. 
Symposium, International Economic Law in a Time of Change: Reassessing 
Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions Brochure (Nov. 
18–20, 2010), http://asil.org/files/2010/asil_IEcLIG_brochure _111010.pdf. 
 12. Again, the authors canvassed the resumes of the participants at that 
meeting, drawn from the schedule of proceedings, www.asil.org/pdfs/ielgconf
0606.pdf. 
 13. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From 
Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
383 (2009) (conducting empirical assessment of complainant win-rates at the 
WTO to demonstrate that the interpretation of WTO agreements via dispute 
settlement has fostered a normative free trade vision, indicating biased rule 
development and some judicial lawmaking); Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. 
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to augment doctrinal legal analysis with empirical research in 
the areas of development,14 international finance and 
investment,15 and international arbitration.16 Not only is the 
use of empirical methodology becoming more prevalent in 
international economic law, but the trend itself is becoming 
increasingly self-conscious (this paper being but one such 
example).17  
II. WHAT CAN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH REALLY TELL US? 
What do we make of this trend? And what are we likely to 
learn as a result? Indeed, can we really trust empirical 
researchers to “get the world right?” Admittedly, empirical 
social scientists hardly have a stellar record of predicting 
outcomes. In 1972, the Club of Rome published its Malthusian 
 
Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
579 (2009) (using statistical analysis to determine, inter alia, that that rather 
than constituting a permanent body of panelists, the WTO would be better 
served by establishing a pool of permanent chairs); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, 
The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895 (2006) 
(demonstrating with empirical data that WTO dissents can and do make a 
difference in WTO jurisprudence).  
 14. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and 
Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 
(2008) (surveying empirical literature to argue for a reconception of the link 
between property rights and development); Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger 
Patents Induce More Local Innovation?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 359, 359 (2004) 
(demonstrating that “benefits of stronger IPRs—to the extent that they exist 
at all—are more likely to come instead from an acceleration in the domestic 
deployment of advanced technology by the affiliates of foreign firms.”). 
 15. See Gary Hufbauer & Daniel Danxia Xie, Financial Stability and 
Monetary Policy: The Need for International Surveillance, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 
939, 939 (2010) (concluding that “[e]mpirical evidence for the USA, other 
[OECD] countries, and a few emerging countries lends strong support for the 
connection between exceptionally fast growth of DFM [de facto money] and 
subsequent financial instability.”); Panagiotis Delimatsis & Pierre Sauvé, 
Financial Services Trade After the Crisis: Policy and Legal Conjectures, 13 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 837, 843–47 (2010) (suggesting empirical means to gauge the 
fallout from the financial crisis); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs 
Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008) (finding 
that stronger BITs that provide access to arbitration are not associated with 
increased investment). 
 16. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 17. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE 
DISCIPLINE (Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2008) 
(containing essays from a prior conference convened by the ASIL International 
Economic Law Interest Group discussing the role of empirical research in 
international economic law). 
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treatise The Limits to Growth, in which it offered a prediction 
that the world might run out of oil by 1992.18 Throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s, a familiar refrain was repeatedly heard 
from historians, economists and economic advisers about the 
rise of Japan, the absolute and relative decline in the 
competitiveness of the U.S., and the need to adopt activist 
industrial policy or forever stand in the shadow of the Rising 
Sun.19 In 1990, Professor John Mearsheimer forecasted the 
imminent decline of NATO20 (which since his prediction has 
grown from 16 members to 28)21 as well as the weakening of 
the European Community22 (which, now the European Union, 
has more than doubled in size, from 12 to 27 members, since 
his prediction).23 As for Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” 
since 9/11 it has been postponed indefinitely.24 And sadly, 
Keynes’ vision of a leisure society—“three-hour shifts or a 
fifteen hour week”25—seems increasingly fantastical. Even in 
France.  
When it comes to predicting outcomes, it seems the less we 
empiricists know the better we do. Take, for example, the 
Supreme Court Forecasting Project, “a friendly 
interdisciplinary competition to compare the accuracy of the 
 
 18. See Treading Lightly: Does Mankind Need More than One Planet?, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1337
251. 
 19. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1994) 
(discussing the popular concern over U.S. competitiveness and, inter alia, 
comparing the myth of Asian economic growth with the reality of Japan’s more 
modest recent growth rate). 
 20. John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After 
the Cold War, 15 INT’L SECURITY 5 (1990), available at 
http://smp.fsv.cuni.cz/Mearsheimer.pdf. 
 21. See NATO Member Countries, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2011). 
 22. See “The Author Replies” in Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane & 
John J. Mearsheimer, Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: 
International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe, 15 INT’L SECURITY 
191 (1990), available at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0015.pdf. 
 23. See Member States of the EU, 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 24. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Free 
Press 2006) (1993). 
 25. A. J. Veal, The Elusive Leisure Society, 17–18 (University of 
Technology Sydney, School of Leisure Sport and Tourism Working Paper No. 
9, 2009) available at http://www.leisuresource.net/service3.aspx (follow link) 
(quoting Keynes’ 1931 essay Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren). 
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different ways in which legal experts and political scientists 
assess and predict Supreme Court decision making.”26 We 
cannot attest to exactly how friendly it turned out to be, but the 
idea was quite intriguing: who would make the better 
prediction of how the Court would decide the next Term’s cases, 
statistical forecasters or constitutional law experts? The rules 
of this friendly competition were as follows. The legal experts 
could read anything, including past court decisions and even 
the parties’ briefs.27 They could also consider extra-legal factors 
if they so desired, such as the Justices’ policy preferences and 
ideologies.28 The statistical model, on the other hand, was 
parsimonious; it took into account only a few bits of 
information, such as the ideology of the circuit court from 
which the case was referred, the type of petitioner and 
respondent, the type of issue and whether constitutionality was 
at stake.29 Using these variables, the model coded every case 
decided by the Supreme Court for the past eight terms prior to 
2002—some 628 cases.30 The results: the model predicted 75% 
of the 68 cases during the 2002 Term correctly.31 The legal 
scholars—with their far more detailed knowledge—made 
correct predictions approximately 59% of the time.32 Of 
particular relevance to our present topic, the statistical model 
hugely outperformed legal experts regarding economic issues 
before the Supreme Court; it correctly predicted how the Court 
would rule about 85% of the time.33 The legal scholars might 
have done better with a coin flip; they were right just less than 
half the time.34  
 
 26. See Supreme Court Forecasting Project, WASH. U. SCH. L., 
http://wusct.wustl.edu/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 27. Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. 
Kim, Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 
PERSP. ON POL. 761, 761 (2004), available at http://wusct.wustl.edu/media/ma
n1.pdf. 
 28. Id. 
 29. The statistical model took into account: “(1) the circuit of origin for the 
case; (2) the issue area of the case, coded from the petitioner’s brief using 
Spaeth’s protocol; (3) the type of petitioner (e.g., the United States, an injured 
person, an employer); (4) the type of respondent; (5) the ideological direction of 
the lower court ruling, also coded from the petitioner’s brief using Spaeth’s 
protocol; and (6) whether or not the petitioner argued the constitutionality of a 
law or practice” (internal footnotes removed). Id. at 762. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 763. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Martin et al., supra note 27, at 765 Figure. 3. 
 34. Id.  
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Prediction, of course, is not understanding. We can predict 
that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but we attorneys have 
not even the most basic understanding of the laws of 
astrophysics. In the Supreme Court example, the empirical 
social scientists involved could not have cared less about 
understanding the contents of the law; they were concerned 
only with predicting the outcomes of discrete cases. Not all 
empirical social scientists, however, are so easily satisfied. Like 
lawyers and legal scholars, they too want to understand the 
law. To do so, empirical researchers have developed 
increasingly sophisticated methods that allow us to analyze 
broad patterns in complex legal texts, and to determine how 
varied actors understand and react to the existence of and 
changes in particular legal rules and institutions.  
One powerful new tool allows researchers to build 
computer models that “search out” not only key words in texts, 
but also word clusters that take into account word-order 
meaning. This sort of methodology can be a particularly useful 
tool to understand very broad patterns in a very large number 
of comparable documents. Professor Arthur Spirling, for 
example, applies this methodology to a central issue in U.S. 
history: the 600 or so treaties and other agreements negotiated 
between the federal government and various Native American 
tribes.35 What distinguishes these treaties over time, he finds, 
is one major linguistic distinction: the harshness of the terms.36 
Without having to read 600 treaties, then, Spirling finds a 
systematic pattern that Native Americans’ bargaining position 
deteriorated vis-à-vis the U.S. at specific times during the 19th 
Century.37  
One more trend in empirical legal research is also worth 
mentioning, and it involves a move to the micro-level. 
Increasingly, empirical researchers are interested in how law 
matters to the way people behave. The problem is that real 
world behavior is subject to scores of influences we social 
scientists cannot control. To ameliorate this problem, 
researchers increasingly are turning to surveys to find out how 
 
 35. See Arthur Spriling, Bargaining Power in Practice: US Treaty-Making 
with American Indians, 1784–1911, Working Paper, Harvard University, 
2010, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~spirling/documents/Spir
lingPolmeth2010.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. Id. at 30–31. 
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people think about international law.38 
As part of the Minnesota conference, we administered just 
such a survey, which was distributed as participants 
registered. It asked participants to give their subjective 
assessment about whether one hypothetical country was a 
relatively risky place to invest, and whether another 
hypothetical country should be considered a good trade partner. 
Not everyone received the exact same information, however; 
only half of respondents were given the italicized and bracketed 
information in the questions set forth below. The variation in 
survey results produced by this small variation in information 
proved astounding:  
Question #1: We first asked participants to assess the 
information provided and answer the following question: How 
risky would you say it is for a manufacturing company in 2010 
to invest in a country with the following characteristics? 
 Has a history of capital controls, but has not interfered 
with the repatriation of profits within the past year, 
 Has not had a fair, competitive national election in the 
past decade, 
 [Has a bilateral investment treaty with an arbitration 
clause with your home country], 
 90% of urban areas have access to electricity 23.4 hours 
per day over the past year, 
 Scores well (above the global average) on the World 
Bank’s “rule of law” scale, 
 Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade. 
Responses (participants were asked to please check 
one): 
_____Risk is likely to be very low 
_____Risk is likely to be moderately low 
_____Risk is likely to be moderately high 
 
 38. The work of Michael Tomz, who conducts empirical research in this 
way and also designs software to allow other researchers to conduct such 
research, is particularly important in this regard. See, e.g., Michael Tomz, The 
Foundation of Domestic Audience Costs: Attitudes, Expectations, and 
Institutions (Apr., 2009), in KITAI, SEIDO, GUROBARU-SHAKAI (EXPECTATIONS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND GLOBAL SOCIETY) (Masaru Kohno and Aiji Tanaka eds., 
2009), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-
Foundations-2009-04-14b.pdf. For statistical software information, see, for 
example, http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/tomz.html.http://www.sta
nford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-Foundations-2009-04-
14b.pdfhttp://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/pubs/Tomz-AudCost-Foundations-2009-
04-14b.pdf. 
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_____Risk is likely to be very high 
Results. Even at a conference of international economic 
lawyers and legal scholars, the existence or non-existence of a 
bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) was seen as very significant 
to the riskiness of investment. Comparing the results of the 
surveys, we observed the following:  
 
Did not get the BIT information:  Did get the BIT information: 
 
 
Just by exposing respondents to the hypothetical “fact” 
that a country had a BIT with the participant’s home country, 
the proportion of responses that categorized the risk as 
moderately to very high dropped from 31% to 21%. No one 
exposed to the BIT information thought the country posed a 
“very high” risk for investors. The sample size is admittedly 
small, but it is interesting that we could see a ten-percentage-
point shift from a high-risk to a low-risk category with political, 
policy, economic and other legal conditions held constant, 
simply by changing the information about the existence of a 
BIT. Thus, a not insignificant number of conference attendees 
believed that the existence of such a commitment may matter 
to the relative risk of an investment.  
Question #2: We also asked each conference participant to 
answer the following question, this time in the area of 
international trade: 
 How desirable would you say a country with the 
following characteristics would be as a potential 
partner in a new bilateral preferential trade 
agreement? The country. . . 
 Is a moderately-sized country classified as “upper-middle 
income” by the World Bank, 
 Is known currently to protect agriculture through 
moderately high tariffs and modest export subsidies, 
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 Is a member of the WTO, 
 [Last year failed to comply with a decision of an appellate 
panel regarding health and safety measures], 
 Is of no particular strategic or political importance to you 
or your country, 
 Has had moderate growth (4-7%) over the past decade. 
Responses (respondents were asked to please check 
one): 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential 
trade agreement is likely to be very low 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential 
trade agreement is likely to be moderately low 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential 
trade agreement is likely to be moderately high 
_____Desirability as a candidate for a new preferential 
trade agreement is likely to be very high. 
Results. Once again, there was an experimental treatment 
embedded in the question: only half of participants were 
exposed to the information that the country had failed to 
comply with an appellate decision of the WTO in the past year. 
Evidently this is unforgivable, at least in the short term, to 
international economic law experts. This information alone had 
a profound impact on participants’ responses, as we can see by 
comparing the answers of those who received the non-
compliance information with the responses of those who did 
not: 
 
Did not get the non-         Did get the non- 
compliance information:      compliance information: 
 
 
Maybe this is the result of experimenting on a conference 
of international lawyers, but this time the results are extreme. 
Sixty-three percent of participants thought the country would 
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make a very or somewhat desirable partner for a preferential 
trade agreement based on economic and political conditions, 
when unaware of its recent non-compliance with an appellate 
decision of the WTO. Evidently, this information is crucial, 
because when it is revealed, a meager 17% of participants 
thought this country would make a “somewhat desirable” 
trading partner, and none thought that this country should be 
considered “very desirable.” The sample group—attendants at 
an ASIL IEL conference—quite clearly view non-compliance 
with the WTO appellate body as a very serious matter indeed. 
If this is how this group reacts to non-compliance, what might 
this mean for decision-makers? While we might expect the 
survey participants to weigh law violations more heavily than 
the average policymaker does, the results of our experiment do 
suggest that a reputation for non-compliance could have 
serious consequences for new agreements down the road. In 
other words, we have some evidence of why, despite its inability 
to enforce its decisions, the dispute settlement mechanism of 
the WTO has some bite. 
Young high-tech researchers are salivating at the prospects 
of converting document series into databases or conducting 
surveys of elite legal actors.39 We write neither to condemn nor 
condone this work—though we agree that these methods have 
interesting possibilities and great risks. The risk is that, in our 
excitement to “know more” and to “see further” using fancy new 
techniques, we will run roughshod over genuine expertise. Any 
associated downside risks will be minimized and upside payoffs 
maximized only to the extent that social scientists listen 
carefully to legal scholars to hone their programs and interpret 
their results. Once legal scholars get over being appalled, there 
will be critical ways in which their insights will help empirical 
researchers who perform legal or textual analysis avoid the 
most egregious errors and make the most of their work. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW  
Forecasting, electronic textual analysis, experiments 
embedded in surveys—these new, improving research methods 
might seem useless to legal researchers. But somehow we need 
 
 39. Some of Professor Simmons’s graduate students, for example, 
presently are using Arabic language programs to analyze several decades of 
Egyptian clerics’ fatwas, as well as Japanese language programs to analyze 
thousands of Japanese electoral platforms.  
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to get a systematic understanding of the way our world 
operates. How can we assess and reassess our legal theories, 
doctrines and make policy prescriptions without more than a 
perfunctory look at the changing world we are trying to 
address? Moreover, how can we possibly talk about policy 
without some idea of the conditions under which legal 
innovations have “worked” in the past? David Trubek’s words 
are apropos in this context: “law cannot be defined [or 
evaluated] other than by the difference it makes in society, and 
empirical inquiry is necessary to determine what that is.”40 It is 
preposterous to imagine we can understand how law works and 
how to design policy without empirical legal studies. We can 
use assumptions to build models and theories, but we need 
facts to build the world we want. 
Make no mistake—we are all empiricists. Each of us 
carries a model in his or her mind about the way the world 
works: lifting trade barriers increases trade, increased trade 
increases global welfare, level playing fields generate “fair” 
results. Realists, in turn, would believe that states renege on 
their legal agreements opportunistically and that hegemonic 
law leads to unfair distributive consequences, bailouts, court 
adverse selection, and moral hazard. What scholars must ask is 
whether these models are “right.” Have the right lessons been 
learned? A very interesting book summarizing the findings of 
decades of psychology research, The Science of Fear, would 
suggest we do not: people consistently overestimate the 
likelihood of sensational outcomes, partly because our brains 
are wired to beware of unlikely but deadly risks, but also 
because the media feeds the market for disastrous news.41 As a 
result, we grossly overestimate the likelihood of falling victim 
to catastrophic events42 or developing breast cancer in one’s 
40s.43 The “facts” many of us carry in our heads just do not 
reflect the facts on the ground. Thus, we cannot simply rely on 
our own understandings of the world—systematic empirical 
knowledge must be substituted for biased worldviews.  
This sort of cognitive bias creates acute challenges (and, 
indeed, opportunities) for researchers and scholars. One scholar 
has encountered some of these challenges in writing her recent 
 
 40. David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and 
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1984). 
 41. See generally DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR (2008).  
 42. Id. at 57.  
 43. Id. at 157–59. 
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book about the positive impact that the ratification of 
multilateral human rights agreements has had on domestic 
politics, litigation, and demands on human rights outcomes.44 
In short, her empirical research shows that, in some cases, 
governments that have ratified the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT) or the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) actually do reduce torture, allow religious 
freedom, and provide fair trials more than comparable 
countries that have not ratified such treaties.45 Why are 
complex quantitative and qualitative methodologies needed to 
demonstrate this convincingly? Because it is somewhat hard to 
believe. These findings cut against the biased information we 
are fed each day: News headlines scream “torture of Iraqi 
detainees by the Iraqi authorities,” using electrocution, electric 
drills, and even execution,46 or reveal images of abuse by 
Indian officers of youth in Kashmir.47 We never see headlines 
about CAT ratifiers that proclaim: “Niger Eschews Torture” or 
“Way to Go Uruguay!” so we conclude that it is naive to think 
that any of the treaties lawyers have carefully crafted over the 
last several decades could possibly be effective; we must be 
wasting our time.  
Biases pervade international investment law as well. Pick 
up (or, more likely, navigate to) a mainstream financial news 
source, and we read about the progress of the growing network 
of bilateral investment treaties in protecting foreign 
investments—to everyone’s advantage. Recently, the Wall 
Street Journal glowed with enthusiasm for a U.S.-India BIT. 
High on Obama’s to-do list in India, declared one op-ed, should 
be “seek[ing] a broad expansion of bilateral trade and 
investment, beginning with a long-delayed Bilateral 
Investment Treaty.”48 Another article put it thus: “Now the 
 
 44. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 273 
(2009). 
 45. See id.  
 46. See Huge Wikileaks Release Shows US ‘Ignored Iraq Torture’, BBC 
NEWS (23 October 2010, 05:42AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-11611319; see also WIKILEAKS, www.wikileaks.org (last visited Jan.26, 
2011). 
 47. See Indian Authorities Must Investigate Online Video of Kashmir 
Detainee Abuse, AMNESTY INT’L (September 12, 2010), http://www.amnesty.org
/en/news-and-updates/indian-authorities-must-investigate-online-video-
kashmir-detainee-abuse-2010-09-13. 
 48. Richard L. Armitage & R. Nicholas Burns, A To-Do List for Obama in 
India, WSJ.COM (November 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052702304155604575581721120234484.html.  
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question is how quickly commercial cooperation can move 
forward, and whether traditional barriers to cross-border 
investment can be removed.”49 The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, reporting on Ecuador’s recent decision to “tear up” a 
number of its bilateral investment treaties as violative of its 
national Constitution, stated that “[t]he government’s decision 
to pull out of investment treaties comes at a time when some 
officials have been seeking to improve perceptions of Ecuador’s 
business climate and will deter foreign investment.”50  
Systematic empirical research provides a quite different 
picture. Overall, research suggests that the ability of BITs to 
attract foreign direct investment is minimal.51 The studies that 
find some positive effects to BIT ratification caution that BITs 
are beneficial in countries that already have strong property 
protection regimes in place. In explaining the rush to negotiate 
and ratify BITs in the 1980s and 1990s, Jose Alvarez wrote a 
fascinating account based on his State Department experience 
during the height of the BITs-signing frenzy. Developing 
countries often entered into BITs without much of an 
understanding about the legal consequences.52 This is 
consistent with the empirical work that was conducted with 
Andrew Guzman and Zachary Elkins on the pattern of BIT 
signings over time. Using a statistical model to analyze the 
probability that any two states would conclude a BIT 
agreement, the study found patterns that suggested the BIT 
cascade of the 1980s and 1990s was a competitive scramble by 
developing countries to impress on creditor nations that the 
latter’s investment will be secure.53 As evidence, developing 
countries tended to ratify BITs when those countries with the 
 
 49. Amol Sharma, Five Ways U.S.-India Trade can Improve, THE WALL 
ST. J. (November 2, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2010/11/02/five-
ways-us-india-trade-can-improve/.  
 50.  Ecuador Economy: Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties Torn Up, 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Sep. 27, 2010), http://www.eiu.com/index.asp
?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=77456592&region_id=&country_id=17900
00179&channel_id=190004019&category_id=500004050&refm=vwCat&page_t
itle=Article&rf=0. 
 51. See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2011). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for 
Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, in THE 
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
369 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin 
eds., 2010). 
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most similar product profile, the most similar infrastructure, 
and the most similar workforces (i.e., their closest competitor 
nations) did so.54 To this, one might add a degree of economic 
desperation; Professor Simmons is doing some work that 
reveals that developing countries were much more likely to 
ratify BITs during periods of economic downturn. Evidence that 
BITs actually attract significant foreign direct investment is 
weak at best.55 There is little doubt about what they 
systematically do attract: international arbitration. The more 
BITs a country signs, the more likely they are to show up on 
the list of cases on the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes website. It is no wonder, then, that 
developing as well as developed countries are having second 
thoughts about BITs, insisting on renegotiation, declaring 
moratoria on new agreements, and, in some cases, even 
terminating existing agreements. We have also seen a recent 
spike in desperate attempts at arbitration award annulments.56 
The empirical work that tries to “take the pulse” of the legal 
regime for protection of FDI suggests that the patient is not all 
that well. 
And yet the fanfare continues. Even if researchers might 
know that, as an empirical matter, BITs rarely meet their 
stated goals, practitioners—politicians and businesses, in 
particular—still believe otherwise. Associations of American 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Jason W. Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment treaties Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 397, 434 (2011). (conducting empirical analysis to conclude that 
“[w]hile BITs are routinely described as important tools for attracting FDI, 
and while certain empirical studies claim to have isolated huge causal 
impacts, my own examination suggests that, at best, BITs spur investment 
only irregularly, inconsistently, and with generally unassuming impact”); 
Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Correlation Versus Causation, in THE EFFECTS OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT, 395 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) 
(identifying a number of serious methodological challenges largely ignored in 
BIT studies, including problems of endogeneity, autocorrelation, and omitted 
variables; finding that once these problems were addressed using appropriate 
statistical methods, significant correlations between BIT ratification and FDI 
inflows disappeared); U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, 105 (1998). 
(concluding that BITs could be expected to “marginally increase” foreign direct 
investment, but such an effect is usually small).  
 56. See Christina Knahr, Annulment and Its Role in the Context of 
Conflict Awards, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 151, 151 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-
Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010).  
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businesses regularly call for the U.S. to negotiate BITs, 
particularly with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (where the 
bulk of foreign direct investment already goes).57 Also, when 
BIT talks with China were announced in June of 2008, for 
example, “American business interests reacted positively” to 
the news.58 Enthusiasm is not limited to the developed world—
developing countries continue to negotiate BITs amongst 
themselves and with the North. 
In this time of crisis and change, researchers are 
inundated with sensationalized and unsophisticated accounts 
of the world. It is, therefore, particularly important that as we 
try to sort out what has happened and how to move forward, we 
do so with the strongest empirical basis we can. Reactionary 
policies grounded in sensational views of the recent crisis are 
the likely result of a failure to merge empirical research with 
legal reform.  
IV. LINKING EMPIRICS WITH LAW AND POLICY 
This takes us to the heart of the matter—in what ways 
does empirical research help international economic lawyers 
and legal scholars in their capacities as policy makers? Two 
avenues, distinct but intimately related, immediately come to 
mind.  
First and foremost, empirical studies give researchers the 
ability to systematically evaluate legal institutions in light of 
their goals. As discussed briefly above, researchers proceeding 
empirically have confirmed that the energies and resources 
expended on negotiating and ratifying multilateral treaties 
about trade and human rights, for example, are not for 
naught—these legal texts do promote many of their stated 
goals.59 One of the first systematic treatments by Andrew Rose, 
a professor in the business school at UC Berkeley, came to 
what for many was a surprising and highly counterintuitive 
conclusion: he found little evidence that countries joining or 
belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns from 
 
 57. See Bush Urged to Pursue BRIC Pacts, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 5, 2007), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/bush-urged-to-pursue-bri
c-pacts/article139409/. 
 58. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. and China Agree to Ease Foreign 
Investment, NY TIMES (Jun. 06, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/bus
iness/worldbusiness/19trade.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=US%20and%20China%20a
gree%20to%20ease%20foreign%20investment%202008&st=cse.  
 59. See SIMMONS, supra note 44. 
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outsiders, though the Generalized System of Preferences seems 
to have a strong effect.60 Empirical work of this kind is 
wonderfully provocative, and scholars got to work to determine 
whether Rose’s findings were robust. Empirical political 
scientists Judith Goldstein, Michael Tomz, and Doug Rivers 
looked at the way “members” were coded in Rose’s study and 
found that there were actually lots of countries who were not 
full members (and therefore not coded as such in Rose’s 
dataset), but had formally been extended all the benefits of 
membership.61 After reflecting in the data that these states do 
in fact “participate” in the regime, Goldstein and her 
collaborators found a strong and positive effect to the 
liberalizing rules of the GATT/WTO.62 In another study, 
however, examining the distributive consequences of 
international economic law, Subramanian and Wei found that 
the WTO promotes trade strongly but unevenly.63 If we were 
sure it was otherwise, it would be high time to determine where 
else to focus our attention. This might be the case in the BIT 
context, where there are certainly questions about whether the 
BIT regime has achieved its goals.64 
As an obvious corollary, empirical research might give us 
reason to support the revision of our legal rules. Consider 
Article 28(2) of the GATT, which allows developing countries to 
implement infant-industry protections.65 Empirical data has 
somewhat consistently shown that infant-industry protections 
do not work to spur long-term growth or development.66 If the 
 
 60. Andrew Rose, Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 98, 98 (Mar. 2004). 
 61. See Judith Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, Do We Really 
Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005, 
2005 (Dec. 2007). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei, The WTO Promotes Trade, 
Strongly but Unevenly, 72 J. INT’L ECON. 151 (2007). 
 64. See Alvarez, supra note 51. 
 65. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/g
att47_02_e.htm (stating that parties implement protective or other measures 
such as flexibility in their tariff structure, grant tariff protection and 
quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes).  
 66. See, e.g., Howard Pack, Industrial Policy: Growth Elixir or Poison?, 15 
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 47, 48, 60 (2000) (surveying past empirical 
evidence disparaging import-substitution and conducting survey to determine 
in part that industrial policy in Japan and Korean at most “may have been a 
minor hormone.”); Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, Asia’s Reemergence, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1997, at 51 (Some modest infant-industry 
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goals of the WTO are to promote trade liberalization, global 
welfare and development, the disconnect between empirics and 
reality might appear disconcerting.  
Second, empirical studies provide facts on which to base 
legal doctrine and public policy. The most famous example of 
this in American law is probably footnote 11 in Brown v. Board 
of Education, where the U.S. Supreme Court cited to social 
psychology studies to support its conclusion that “separate but 
equal” segregated educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.67 Certainly doing so was not necessary to the Court’s 
analysis—it could have relied on the moral and doctrinal 
judgment that discrimination per se is injurious—but the 
persuasive power of such research is at times undeniable.  
In the area of international trade, it is becoming clear that 
legal structures and processes are having important impacts on 
outcomes—and that we should remember these lessons when 
considering how these agreements might be modified in the 
future. An important body of empirical work by a number of 
international trade scholars—beginning in earnest with Robert 
Hudec—determined that developing countries, particularly 
Least Developed Countries, initiated GATT/WTO disputes 
significantly less frequently than they “should,” and even then 
garnered only mixed results in trade litigation.68 Especially 
 
successes have been noted in large countries, though balanced by high costs, 
and its record elsewhere “is one of almost unremitting failure”); Anne O. 
Krueger & Baran Tuncer, An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument, 
72 AM. ECON. REV. 1142, 1142 (1982). 
 67. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also Edmond 
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 1955 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 655, 655–58 (1955) (discussing 
the meaning and dangers of footnote 11).  
 68. See MARC L. BUSCH & ERIC REINHARDT, Developing Countries and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, passim (2003) (demonstrating empirically 
that the WTO “only serves to reinforce th[e] tendency [of developing countries 
to exact few concessions from defendants in trade litigation], given both the 
incentives to litigate as well as developing countries’ lack of capacity to push 
for early settlement.”); Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT 
Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 6 (1993); 
see also Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity 
Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization 
Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (2005) (conducting an empirical analysis of 
disputing behavior in the GATT and concluding that poorer countries chose 
their targets strategically so as to conserve their legal and other resources, 
thus choosing only the biggest targets, and only initiating disputes rarely); see 
generally Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: 
Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. 
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troubling was Marc Busch’s revelation that LDCs were one-
third less likely to file complaints against developed states 
under the WTO than they were under the post-1989 GATT 
regime.69 This research also pointed to reasons for this trend: 
the WTO’s increased legal and procedural complexity resulted 
in higher costs and required greater legal capacity.70 Most 
striking are not these conclusions, which developing countries 
and their advocates already knew well,71 but their results—
these findings gave credence to calls from developing countries 
for the establishment of an Advisory Centre on WTO Law (the 
Advisory Centre), which was finally formed in 2001.72 The 
Advisory Centre’s “mission is to provide developing countries 
and LDCs with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to 
take full advantage of the benefits and opportunities offered by 
the WTO.”73 After the better part of a decade, the Advisory 
Centre has assisted developing countries initiate some 19 
complaints—the same number of complaints that the U.S. itself 
initiated in the same time period.74 
 
HUDEC 457, 466–68 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) 
(explaining why LDCs are not as active in the WTO dispute settlement 
system). 
 69. Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of 
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948–1998, EMORY UNIVERSITY, 15–21 (Feb. 
16, 2000), userwww.service.emory.edu/~erein/research/initiation.pdf. 
 70. See Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade 
Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. 
HUDEC 457, 467 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) 
(noting the various reasons put forward by empirical researchers to explain 
under-participation by developing countries under-participation in WTO 
dispute settlements).  
 71. See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law: 
Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 723, 724–26 (1999) 
(describing various developing country proposals for a capacity-building 
institution and advocating its creation). 
 72. See The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 
Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/documents/agreement_establis
hing.pdf (noting in its opening preamble that “developing countries, in 
particular the least developed among them, and the countries with economies 
in transition have limited expertise in WTO law and the management of 
complex trade disputes and their ability to acquire such expertise is subject to 
severe financial and institutional constraints . . . .”).  
 73. The ACWL’s Mission, ADVISORY CTR. ON WTO LAW, 
http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/about_us.html (last visited February 1, 2011). 
 74. Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, Report on Operations: 2009, 8 (2009) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/reports.html 
(“[B]etween 2001 and 2008, the [Advisory Centre] (nineteen times) has worked 
legally on behalf of the complainant members in more disputes than any WTO 
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Consider as well the rise and fall of Strategic Trade Policy 
(STP). In the 1980s, a group of economists—Nobel Prize winner 
Paul Krugman among them—developed a powerful theoretical 
critique of comparative advantage in high-technology 
industries characterized by increasing returns to scale. Always 
provocative, Krugman at first questioned whether free trade 
had become passé,75 but when he saw his theories being co-
opted by protectionist policy-makers he was relentless in 
demanding thorough empirical research before making this 
theory operational.76 In the U.S. at least, the push for STP has 
diminished, and seemingly for the best: aside from the complex 
political economy problems posed by STP, empirical research 
on each major attempt at STP has shown that the policy 
imposed net costs each time.77 The STP saga demonstrates the 
limits of theoretical models (and reactionary policy-making) 
and the importance of empirical study to effectively translate 
theory into policy and practice. 
Recent BITs research is also instructive. Notwithstanding 
the problems with BITs, researchers Tobin and Busch recently 
analyzed annual data on pairs of developing and developed 
countries between 1960 and 2004, concluding that BITs raise 
the prospects of getting a North-South preferential trade 
agreement, at least up to a point.78 Thus, we might encourage 
negotiation of BITs as an indirect way to increase trade and 
investment flows. Viewed in this light, the recent commentary 
 
member acted as a complainant in its own disputes except for the United 
States (also nineteen times) and the EC (twenty-one times). Put differently, if 
the ACWL were not an intergovernmental organization but instead were itself 
a WTO member country, it would be considered as the third most frequently 
active complainant litigant.”). 
 75. Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 131 
(1987). 
 76. See generally Krugman, supra note 17.  
 77. See id. at 113; Paul R. Krugman, Making Sense of the Competitiveness 
Debate, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 23–24 (1996) (contrasting the 
“punditry on the semiconductor industry” with the realities of intervention in 
that sector); See generally Wilfred J. Ethier, Modern International Economics 
274–767 (3rd ed. 1995) (describing European and Japanese semiconductor 
policies); PAUL KRUGMAN & ALASDAIR SMITH, Introduction, in EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 1, 7 (1994) (“It is also true that the 
research generally provides little support for a drastic rethinking of trade 
policy. Nobody has yet provided empirical evidence that would suggest large 
gains from protection or export subsidy.”). 
 78. Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT is Better Than a Lot: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD 
POL. 1, 31 (2010). 
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on the occasion of Obama’s trip to India may not seem so 
flawed.79 
Empiricism, of course, is just one tool in the woodshed. 
Legal institutions are political compromises between competing 
goals, not real-world manifestations of state-of-the-art 
statistical analysis. Although empirical methodologies are 
important in discovering how our legal institutions operate and 
how they impact our world, we cannot begin to truly 
understand them simply by running regressions. In translating 
empirics into policy, the role of the lawyer, the political 
economist, and the politician are paramount, given their 
intimate knowledge of the institutional and normative 
constraints that operate on the ground. Thus, even if some 
empirical studies demonstrate the weakness of the theories 
underlying particular international economic laws, we might 
not actually expend resources on their revision for a number of 
reasons—in the infant-industry context, for example, because 
of what Article 28(b) represents to developing countries: the 
recognition of their historical experience and the importance of 
policy space as a general principle.80 Thus, when we are 
evaluating our world and the legal institutions that create it, 
empirical studies are undeniably important, but they can never 
tell the whole story. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The ASIL IELG brought scholars together to understand 
and influence a time of change in international economic law. 
This is no easy task, and will require in-depth study by 
researchers from a broad range of disciplines. It is our firm 
belief that an important—indeed, an indispensable—tool of 
international economic law going forward will be systematic 
empirical research. Given its unique nexus with economics, 
political economy, international relations, and domestic and 
international law, the empirical turn in international economic 
law is no coincidence, and should be embraced. We do not mean 
to argue that it is essential for legal scholars to run out and get 
a Ph.D. in statistics or economics or social science. In most 
 
 79. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 80. John Ruggie might describe this as a manifestation of “embedded 
liberalism.” See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, 
and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L 
ORG 379, 379–80 (1982). 
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cases that would be an utter waste of a lawyer’s time and 
training. One does not need a Ph.D. in social sciences to make 
appropriate use of empirical research—one only needs a friend 
or colleague with empirical training. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration unlocks synergies; this is the university’s version 
of comparative advantage.  
Notwithstanding increases in the amount of empirical 
international economic law research and advances in the 
quality of empirical methodologies, however, controversy 
remains as to whether the empirical trend is a good thing for 
the study of international economic law. On the one hand, there 
are those who push back on empiricism’s own terms. What does 
this empirical data actually tell us? Why is it important? Are 
the conclusions robust, and why do social scientists turn up so 
many inconsistent answers? Everyone should be asking these 
questions of empirical research—this is not a sore spot felt by 
the legal academy alone.  
But we sense the anxieties among some legal scholars run 
deeper. Some are concerned that empirical research is not, and 
certainly should not be, what the legal academy is all about. 
Social science and legal scholarship are distinct enterprises 
with inherently different purposes, it is easy to believe, and 
each discipline is taught to put its intellectual firepower to 
different use. Science is always a hypothesis from which we can 
advance in the face of better evidence or more convincing 
theory. The key is absolute transparency in data methods—
publicness and replicability are primary values. As Keynes 
famously wrote in his 1933 Essays in Biography, “There is no 
harm in being sometimes wrong—especially if one is promptly 
found out.”81 (Which, to our occasional embarrassment, we all 
can potentially be!) More important than the “stance” a 
researcher takes today is her commitment to the scientific 
process, to the treatment of data as public goods. Social 
scientists can critique, bicker, and collaborate, but we don’t 
have to settle anything by the end of the day. The normal 
science model is all about edging toward the truth in the long 
run, and generally doing so in a cooperative, as opposed to 
adversarial, way. 
Legal scholars are trained to use their intellectual skills 
differently: to make the best case to win the point. At the end of 
the day, a decision must be taken in a case or a policy must be 
 
 81.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYES, ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY 317 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 
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chosen and implemented. The need to decide pushes legal 
scholars into their respective positions. The pressure of a 
decision also makes legal scholars less tolerant of ambiguity 
and uncertainty, both of which are rife in the “scientific” 
enterprise. Social scientists draw conclusions with varying 
degrees of certainty, measured by confidence intervals, but 
advocates cannot be wafflers. Lee Epstein and Gary King aptly 
described the nature of the problem thus: “An attorney who 
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. 
who advocates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored.”82  
This viewpoint overstates the gulf between social scientists 
and lawyers to some extent. As our opening tale about Holmes 
and Watson suggests, and as we have intended to convey, there 
undoubtedly are important synergies that can be achieved via 
partnerships between legal scholars and empirical researchers. 
Of particular benefit to lawyers, the factual groundwork to 
evaluate legal institutions and formulate policy prescriptions 
will be better laid. For empirical researchers, the benefits are 
immense as well: lawyers and legal scholars can focus us on 
questions that actually need answering, can help us 
understand why things are the way they are and what 
possibilities there are for the future, and are the conduits by 
which data and doctrine are translated into policy. At the most 
fundamental level, moreover, empirical researchers and 
lawyers are engaged in the same impossible task: a search for 
the truth. By working together, international economic lawyers 
and empirical researchers can focus on the most important 
variables and the most important questions—while using legal 
scholars’ doctrinal, philosophical, and public policy knowledge 
to confirm and explain empirical findings—thereby improving 
the process by which data is accumulated and distributed. This, 
in turn, will increase the value of empirical research to 
international economic lawyers. There is hope yet that we can 
see eye to eye, and in doing so, improve our vision. 
We hope that our readers—lawyers and legal scholars in 
particular—will consider the extent to which their work 
depends upon empirical claims about our world. We find 
ourselves in a period of crisis and change—consider too 
whether we are relying on sensationalized worldviews in 
formulating our beliefs and policies. And consider, finally, the 
comparative advantages you possess in analyzing your world. 
 
 82. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
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The possibilities for collaboration are many, and we should all 
think about whether it would enrich our scholarship to work 
together to an even greater degree than we already have. 
 
